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Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation focuses on the life-cycle environmental performance ofproducts and has significant implications for management theory and practice. In this paper, we examine the
influence of EPR policy parameters on product design and coordination incentives in a durable product supply
chain. We model a manufacturer supplying a remanufacturable product to a customer over multiple periods.
The manufacturer invests in two design attributes of the product that impact costs incurred by the supply
chain—performance, which affects the environmental impact of the product during use, and remanufacturability,
which affects the environmental impact post-use. Consistent with the goals of EPR policies, the manufacturer
and the customer are required to share the environmental costs incurred over the product’s life cycle. The
customer has a continuing need for the services of the product and optimizes between the costs of product
replacement and the costs incurred during use. We demonstrate how charges during use and post-use can be
used as levers to encourage environmentally favorable product design. We analyze the impact of supply chain
coordination on design choices and profit and discuss contracts that can be used to achieve coordination, both
under symmetric and asymmetric information about customer attributes.
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1. Introduction and Literature
With increasing public awareness and concern about
the environmental impacts of products and produc-
tion processes, goal-oriented approaches are being
sought to encourage sustainable design and use of
products. An excellent example of such an approach
is Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR), which fo-
cuses on the life-cycle environmental performance
of products. There are two related objectives of any
EPR policy—shifting responsibility upstream toward
the manufacturer and away from municipalities, and
providing incentives to manufacturers to incorporate
environmental considerations into the design of their
products (OECD 2001). Product design decisions under
EPR thus need to reflect life-cycle considerations in-
cluding manufacturing, pricing, product use, post-use
disposal, and remanufacturing. However, there is very
little research that analytically examines the influence
of EPR policies on the strategic decisions of product
design, pricing, and supply chain coordination.
Consider a manufacturer of a diesel engine selling
to a fleet operator. The manufacturer could undertake
design measures to improve the environmental per-
formance of the engine during use (e.g., greater
energy efficiency that would translate into lower
emissions),
or make the engine easier to remanufacture post-use
(and, hence, minimize the amount of waste generated
and disposed). A profit-maximizing manufacturer
would trade off investments required to implement
these measures against the possibility of generating
higher revenues or lower costs over the product’s
economic life, while complying with EPR mandates.
In a durable good context where the manufacturer
and the customer interact repeatedly, it is also likely
that the parties evaluate alternatives to selling, such
as leasing, or solutions-based approaches such as in-
stalled base management. For example, under its
‘‘evergreen lease,’’ the carpet manufacturer Interface
leases a ‘‘floor-covering service’’ for a monthly fee,
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accepting responsibility for the maintenance and re-
placement of installed carpeting. This arrangement,
together with the use of Interface’s remanufacturable
carpeting material, reduces material and land-filling
costs. Schindler leases ‘‘vertical transportation ser-
vices’’ in favor of selling elevators because leasing lets
it capture the savings from its elevators’ lower energy
and maintenance costs (see Lovins et al. 1999 for fur-
ther examples).
We address three main questions in this paper:
1. Do EPR programs provide adequate incentives
to manufacturers to design environmentally
friendly durable products? How do different
EPR levers affect these incentives?
2. How can contracts be structured to improve
supply chain profitability and environmental
product design? How do these contracts com-
pare in the specific context of EPR?
3. How do customer attributes affect incentives for
product design and supply chain coordination?
How does a lack of perfect information about
these attributes affect such incentives?
Our models permit the consideration of commonly
used financial EPR incentives (e.g., advance or end-
of-life disposal fees, shared fees between producers
and consumers, etc.) and design standards. We do
not model the infrastructural elements of reverse
supply chains. Specifically, we consider the following
scenario. A single manufacturer supplies a reman-
ufacturable, durable product to a single customer.
Hauser and Lund (2003) note that frequent and expert
buyers who possess substantial experience in pur-
chasing remanufactured products and in evaluating
their performance objectively are most often found
in commercial and industrial markets. We assume
that such a customer has a continuing need for the ser-
vices of the product and optimizes between the costs
of product replacement and the costs incurred during
product use. We model two design attributes of the
product—a unidimensional measure of environmen-
tal performance (such as energy efficiency) during
product use, and a measure of product remanufactur-
ability, modeled as the fraction of the product that can
be recovered after use. EPR legislation generally
requires that manufacturers take back products post-
use. The portion of the product that cannot be recov-
ered and has to be disposed of incurs a charge that
might be shared between the manufacturer and the
customer. In addition, product use results in environ-
mentally harmful impacts (such as emissions of
greenhouse gases and harmful particulates) during
product use. For example, the European Commis-
sion (EC) recently recommended that airlines be in-
cluded in the European Union (EU)’s Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Trading Program, thus making them ac-
countable for carbon dioxide emissions during flight
operations. The UK Commission for Integrated Trans-
port points out that future transport and climate
change policy will involve significant point sources
such as truck fleet operators and transportation com-
panies in emissions trading. The Auto-Oil Program in
the EU resulted in legislation that makes manufactur-
ers responsible for emissions from light vehicles; also
underway are proposals that aim to limit or impose
charges on emissions from automobiles owned by
individual customers. The EC is also considering
‘‘differentiated’’ emissions taxes charged on the basis
of consumer behavior as one of its policy options (EC
2007).
Thus, design choices by the manufacturer affect not
only production costs, but also the costs incurred
during use and post-use. Moreover, customer be-
havior has a significant influence on the product’s
environmental impact. Driving habits are known to
affect emissions from automobiles as much as engine
design does. It is also well known that operating
conditions have an impact on the energy efficiencies
of electrical and electronic equipment, and industrial
and household appliances. A manufacturer might not
have complete information about customer attributes
that affect the product’s environmental impact. This
information asymmetry can affect the manufacturer’s
design and pricing decisions and, in turn, envi-
ronmental outcomes. The importance of considering
heterogeneous customer behavior and information
asymmetries among participants in the context of
EPR has been recently recognized by other authors as
well (e.g., Grimes-Casey et al. 2007). We analyze both
the symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios
with heterogeneous customer types.
EPR instruments available to the regulator are var-
ied, although most fall under the general categories of
product recovery targets, environmental performance
standards, disposal charges, and charges for environ-
mental impact during product use (OECD 2001). In
this paper, we limit ourselves to two types of EPR
policy levers—charges for environmental impact dur-
ing use and charges for environmental impact post-
use, both of which may be shared between the man-
ufacturer and customer. These levers work by offering
economic incentives for manufacturers to change
product designs and for customers to change their
consumption behavior. We abstract from the regula-
tor’s decision process for setting appropriate levels for
these charges, and focus instead on how these policy
levers influence upstream design choices, product re-
placement decisions, and coordination incentives in
the supply chain.
A growing body of literature studies the interface
between operational decisions and the environment in
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the context of closed-loop supply chains (see Atasu
et al. 2008, Corbett and Kleindorfer 2001a, b, Guide
and Van Wassenhove 2006a, b, and papers referenced
therein). Toffel (2003) provides an excellent overview
of recent developments in take-back legislation and
their likely impacts on organizational decision mak-
ing. Runkel (2003) examines how EPR influences the
choice of product durability and social welfare. We
draw from this stream of literature for our model
constructs. A novel contribution of our work lies in
the explicit incorporation of environmental legislation
into managerial decisions related to remanufacturable
product design and supply chain coordination. We
also contrast various contractual alternatives includ-
ing price-replacement interval contracts, two-part
tariffs, and leasing in the specific context of EPR.
Several researchers have examined the economic
and social efficiencies of various policy instruments
such as taxes, subsidies, standards, and take-back re-
quirements; e.g. Calcott and Walls (2000), Eichner and
Pethig (2001), Fullerton and Wu (1998), Palmer and
Walls (1997), and Dinan (1993). The typical objective
in this stream of research is for the social planner to
maximize net social surplus subject to resource con-
straints, material balance constraints, and production
functions. This literature is primarily concerned with
design attributes that affect the end-of-life environ-
mental impact of products. An environmentally
favorable design implies lower material consump-
tion, higher fraction of product recycled, or lower cost
of recycling (Calcott and Walls 2000, Dinan 1993, Ful-
lerton and Wu 1998). A consistent finding is that a
combined tax/subsidy, where there is a consumption
good tax and a recycling subsidy (such as in a de-
posit–refund system) can yield the socially optimal
product design and quantity of waste. Our focus,
however, is on the managerial implications of EPR
policies and resulting incentives for supply chain co-
ordination. In addition, we model the customer’s
product replacement decision more richly and con-
sider product design attributes that have environ-
mental impacts both at end-of-life as well as during
use.
We find that EPR levers have interesting impacts on
the manufacturer’s incentives. Lower environmental
charges during product use lead the manufacturer to
provide higher performance but lower remanufactur-
ability. This is because a customer incurring lower
costs during use replaces the product less often, thus
lowering the manufacturer’s incentive to invest in re-
manufacturability. Similarly, when the customer bears
a greater share of costs during use, the manufacturer
has a stronger incentive to provide higher reman-
ufacturability; she also provides higher performance if
the production cost does not increase significantly.
Disposal costs are traditionally used to influence a
product’s end-of-life environmental impact. However,
our results show that disposal charges could encour-
age designs that reduce the product’s environmental
impact during use.
We also examine how the structure of the supply
chain affects incentives faced by the manufacturer and
the customer. We show that a coordinated supply
chain not only makes a higher profit but also chooses
environmentally superior product attributes than an
uncoordinated chain. We therefore examine contracts
that can help achieve coordination and contrast them
in the EPR context. In the symmetric information sce-
nario, we show how arrangements such as price-
replacement interval contracts, two-part tariffs, and
leasing can be used to achieve coordination in a de-
centralized supply chain. When the manufacturer has
incomplete information about the customer’s prod-
uct-use behavior, a menu of contracts can be used to
help coordinate the chain. Our approach allows us to
examine the impacts of both a lack of supply chain
coordination, as well as a lack of perfect information
about customer behavior, on incentives for environ-
mental product design. In particular, we show that the
effects of EPR levers on the manufacturer’s design
incentives depend on supply chain structure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the
integrated supply chain benchmark. Section 4 in-
cludes the analysis for the decentralized supply chain
with symmetric information. We first analyze a price-
only contract, followed by contracts that help achieve
coordination. Section 5 discusses these coordinating
contracts. Section 6 presents the analysis of a coordi-
nating contract under asymmetric information. Section
7 concludes the paper and provides directions for fu-
ture research. All proofs are included in Appendix A.
2. The Model
A manufacturer supplies a remanufacturable, durable
product to a single customer. The customer has a
continuing need for the services of the product and
obtains a fixed utility (or revenue) per period from the
product. At the end of the product’s economic life, the
product is returned to the manufacturer, who reman-
ufactures it for another cycle of use by the customer.
We consider the manufacturer’s planning horizon to
be the time period over which design choices remain
unchanged and during which it is viable to remanu-
facture the product. At the beginning of this horizon,
the manufacturer decides on two design attributes of
the product—one which determines the environmen-
tal performance of the product during product use,
and the other which determines the product’s envi-
ronmental impact post-use. Design choices affect
environmental costs borne by the supply chain and,
hence, the optimal price charged by the manufacturer
Subramanian, Gupta and Talbot: Product Design and Coordination under EPR
Production and Operations Management 18(3), pp. 259–277, r 2009 Production and Operations Management Society 261
at each replacement instance as well as the replace-
ment policy employed by the customer. Note that our
usage of environmental costs does not refer to private
abatement costs or external social costs but rather the
environmental charges imposed on the supply chain
by EPR legislation.
We model a unidimensional measure of environ-
mental performance during product use q, analogous to
the modeling of product performance or quality in
Chen (2001), Kornish (2001), and Moorthy and Png
(1992). The product’s remanufacturability is determined
by the second attribute y. We model yA[0, 1] as the
fraction of the product (say, by weight) that can be
recovered after use, similar to Debo et al. (2005),
Fleischmann et al. (2001), and Fullerton and Wu
(1998). As in Debo et al. (2005) and Calcott and Walls
(2000), y influences the cost of production through the
value recovered from post-use product. The cost of
production is bounded above by the cost of manu-
facturing a new product, and decreases in y. Let c(q, y)
denote the unit production cost and k(q, y) denote the
design cost borne by the manufacturer.
We consider two types of costs that the product in-
curs over its economic life. The first type of cost is
incurred during product use. As discussed in Section
1, such costs are real and measurable. An airline
bound by limits on carbon dioxide emissions will
have to buy permits to cover emissions or pay a fine.
The manufacturer can reduce these costs by manu-
facturing fuel-efficient engines, for example. The
nature of product use by the customer also influences
costs incurred during product use. The second type of
cost relates to the disposal of the product at the end of
its economic life. The portion of the product that can-
not be recovered and has to be disposed of incurs
landfilling or scrapping costs. The manufacturer can
reduce disposal costs incurred at end-of-life by de-
signing the product to be more remanufacturable.
We model two possible customer types: a normal
customer (i 5 1) incurs higher costs during product
use than an efficient customer (i 5 2). Let ei(q) denote
the rate at which costs are incurred during customer
type i’s use of the product and let w(y) denote the cost
of waste disposal. Our analysis can be replicated if w
depends on customer type, although we believe that
customer behavior influences costs during product
use to a greater extent than disposal costs. We look at
two information scenarios. In the symmetric informa-
tion scenario, customer type is common knowledge.
In the asymmetric information scenario, a customer’s
type is his private information, and the manufacturer
has prior beliefs that the customer is of type 1 (or
normal) with probability r, where rA[0, 1]. The man-
ufacturer’s beliefs and all cost parameters are
common knowledge. We make the following func-
tional assumptions:
ASSUMPTION A1. cq40, cqq40, cyo0.
ASSUMPTION A2. kq40, kqq40, ky40, kyy40, kqy 5 0.
ASSUMPTION A3. eiqo0, eiqq40; e14e2; e1q
 o e2q .
ASSUMPTION A4. wyo0.
ASSUMPTION A5. wjy¼04cðq; yÞjy¼0.
Assumption A1 implies that the unit production
cost decreases with remanufacturability y and in-
creases convexly in performance q. A2 implies that the
manufacturer’s design costs are separable in q and y,
and are increasing and convex in both q and y. Both
these assumptions are intuitive and are commonly
used (Debo et al. 2005, Kim and Chhajed 2002, Moor-
thy and Png 1992). To give further structure to the
problem, we assume k to be of the general form
k1uðqÞ þ k2vðyÞ, where u and v are polynomial func-
tions with degree  2. Assumption A3 implies that
cost during product use is decreasing and convex in q,
and is decreasing in customer type. Moreover, the
efficient customer makes better use of the product’s
performance; i.e., the rate of decrease in e with respect
to q is higher for the efficient customer. Assumption
A4 implies that the cost of waste disposal increases in
the amount of waste disposed of. A5 assumes that the
cost of complete product disposal is greater than the
cost of producing a new product, thus ensuring that
the supply chain always has an incentive to recover
some value from the product at end-of-life.
EPR policies differ in specifications of minimum
design standards (qs and ys), if any, levels of the en-
vironmental charges e and w, as well as the divisions
of these environmental charges between the manu-
facturer and the customer. Let a and b denote the EPR-
mandated fractions of e and w, respectively, borne by
the customer. Without loss of generality, we set qs and
ys 5 0.
The sequence of decisions is as follows. Let T de-
note the planning horizon. In a given EPR scenario,
the manufacturer first chooses design features q and
y jointly. The manufacturer then chooses the price r to
be offered to the customer for product replacements.
In each period, customer type i earns a revenue f and
the supply chain incurs costs ei(q) from product use.
At each product replacement instance, the supply
chain incurs a disposal cost w(y) and the manufacturer
incurs a unit cost of remanufacturing the product
c(q, y). Note again that the aforementioned costs
depend on the manufacturer’s design choices.
The customer accepts r if he makes at least his
reservation profit from employing an optimal product
replacement policy, given q, y, and r. To model the
replacement decision, we adapt the classic equipment
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replacement models to our context. The customer’s
replacement decision in Clapham (1957) involves de-
termining an optimum point in time to replace the
product by trading off replacement costs against costs
incurred during product use. A more general eco-
nomic life model would consider discounting, as in
Bellman (1955), but such a model lacks analytical
tractability in our context. However, it can be verified
numerically that the replacement policy in a dis-
counted-profit model is structurally similar to that in
the average-profit model used in this paper.
We use the following notation. Superscript M refers
to the manufacturer, C the customer, and SC the sup-
ply chain. Subscript IN refers to an integrated supply
chain, DS a decentralized supply chain under sym-
metric information. Subscripts PR, TP, and LS refer to
price-replacement interval, two-part tariff, and leasing
contracts under symmetric information, and AM refers
to a decentralized supply chain under asymmetric
information when a menu of contracts is used.
3. A Benchmark: Integrated Supply
Chain
We first analyze the integrated supply chain. In each
period of product use, the integrated supply chain
with customer type i earns a revenue f and faces an
environmental cost gradient ei. At each replacement
instance, replacement cost c and disposal cost w are
incurred. The average supply chain profit per period





















The optimal replacement interval given q and y is de-
termined by maximizing PINi with respect to t and is





. This expression is analogous
to the familiar EOQ formula for choosing the optimal
order quantity, given the fixed cost of ordering, the
unit cost of the product being ordered, and the
inventory holding cost rate. The sum of the cost of
the product and the cost of waste disposal is analo-
gous to the fixed ordering cost in the EOQ model. The
cost gradient ei during product use is analogous to









The manufacturer in the integrated supply chain
chooses q and y to maximize (2). Proposition 1 shows
that for sufficiently large design costs, the profit func-
tion in (2) is jointly concave in q and y.
PROPOSITION 1. 9 k1;k2 such that 8k14k1 and k24k2,




maximizes PINi , where












PROOF. See Appendix A.
We make the following additional assumption for
the remainder of this paper.
ASSUMPTION A6. Design costs are sufficiently large so
that the manufacturer’s or the integrated supply chain’s
profits are jointly concave with respect to q and y.
With Assumption A6, it follows that there exists a




that maximizes PINi . Proposi-
tion 2 compares the optimal design choices corre-







PROOF. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 shows that an efficient customer does
not entirely drive superior environmental design
choices, thus reflecting a fundamental trade-off
that the manufacturer faces in making design choices
while accounting for customer attributes and replace-
ment behavior. While the manufacturer provides
higher performance when the customer is efficient,
she reduces the product’s remanufacturability. This is
because a supply chain with an efficient customer in-
curs lower costs during use and therefore replaces the
product less often; this lowers the incentive for greater
remanufacturability since remanufacturing and dis-
posal costs are incurred less often.
4. Decentralized Supply Chain
We next analyze the scenario where the manufacturer
and the customer are independent entities who pri-
vately maximize their profits. We assume in this
section that the manufacturer and the customer share
common knowledge of all cost parameters as well as
the customer’s type. We first characterize the per-
formance of the decentralized supply chain under
a price-only contract and contrast this performance to
that of the integrated supply chain. Thereafter, we
explore contracts that can coordinate the supply
chain.
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4.1. Price-Only Contract
Price-only contracts are commonly used and represent
the simplest arrangement between independent enti-
ties in supply chains. We employ the usual backward
induction technique to solve the model.
4.1.1. Customer’s Problem. If the customer accepts
the price r offered by the manufacturer, he incurs his
share b of the product disposal cost w and pays a price
r to the manufacturer at each replacement instance.
In each period, customer type i earns revenue f and
incurs his share a of environmental costs ei from
product use. The customer chooses a replacement

















. Without loss of generality, we set
the customer’s reservation profit to zero. Since the
customer will only accept the contract if he makes at
least his reservation profit, the customer’s partici-





4.1.2. Manufacturer’s Problem. The manufacturer’s
objective is to maximize her average profit per period.
Assuming that her reservation profit is zero, the

















Manufacturer’s Price Decision: We first solve for the
manufacturer’s price decision given q and y.
OBSERVATION 1. Given design choices q and y, PMDSi
increases in the price r  c charged to the customer.
This result is not obvious because it is possible for
the manufacturer to trade away the magnitude of
revenue in each replacement instance for a higher
frequency of product replacements. Corollary 1 fol-
lows (stated without proof).
COROLLARY 1.
(i) It is optimal for the manufacturer to price the prod-









(iii) An efficient customer pays a higher price and








The price charged by the manufacturer increases
in the revenue earned by the customer and decreases
in the costs incurred. Moreover, the manufacturer
fully reimburses the customer his share of waste
disposal costs. Therefore, the optimal replacement
interval chosen by the customer is independent of
b and w; the replacement interval depends only on
revenue per period and the customer’s share of costs
during product use. However, as will be discussed
later, disposal costs do influence the manufacturer’s
design choices.
Manufacturer’s Design Decision: In the first stage of the
sequence of decisions, the manufacturer chooses q and
y, incorporating the optimal price rDSi and the cus-
tomer’s optimal replacement interval tDSi , to maximize
PMDSi ¼





To ensure non-negativity of the manufacturer’s
profit in (4), we assume that a412, i.e., the customer
bears a larger share of costs during use. This as-
sumption is likely to hold in most circumstances
where the environmental impact of products during
use is influenced by customer behavior. From
Assumption A6 and Proposition 1 mutatis mutandis,
the manufacturer’s profit in (4) is jointly concave




Þ that maximizes PMDSi .
4.2. Discussion
We summarize the main results for the decentralized
supply chain below and compare the outcomes to
those in the integrated supply chain benchmark.
4.2.1. Impact of Customer Type. Recall that an
efficient customer makes better use of the product’s
performance and incurs lower costs during product
use than a normal customer. The following prop-
osition summarizes the effects of customer type on the













PROOF. See Appendix A.
Thus, in an EPR regime where the manufacturer
shares costs both during product use and at end-of-
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life, the manufacturer benefits from the customer
being efficient despite the fact that the efficient type
replaces the product less often. However, the envi-
ronmental design implications of customer type are
not that clear. Proposition 3(ii) shows that, while the
efficient customer induces the manufacturer to de-
sign the product with lower environmental impact
during use (i.e., higher q), he leads the manufacturer
to design the product with higher environmental
impact at end-of-life (i.e., lower y). By assumption,
the efficient customer incurs lower costs during
product use but waste disposal costs are the same for
both customer types. Under symmetric information,
the manufacturer knows the customer’s type, and
can raise the price for the efficient customer in order
to appropriate the customer’s cost savings from be-
ing efficient. Since the efficient customer makes
better use of product’s performance (Assumption
A3), the manufacturer’s incentive to provide q is
greater. The higher price leads the efficient customer
to replace the product less often, which translates
into a diminished incentive for the manufacturer to
provide remanufacturability because the manufac-
turer faces disposal costs less often.
4.2.2. Impact of Supply Chain Coordination. Our
focus is on the effect of coordination on profit and
upstream product design in the particular context
of EPR. The total profit for the decentralized sup-







since PCDSi ¼ 0. Proposition 4 summarizes the main
results.
PROPOSITION 4.
(i) For the same design choices, the integrated supply
chain always makes a higher profit than the decen-




(ii) The integrated supply chain’s design choices are en-
vironmentally superior to those of the decentralized







PROOF. See Appendix A.
The result in Proposition 4(i) is as expected. The
loss to the supply chain from a lack of coordination
can be understood as follows. In the decentralized
supply chain, the manufacturer prices the product
above her marginal cost, i.e., r4cþ ð1 bÞw, which
affects the customer’s product replacement fre-
quency; for the same design choices, the customer
in the decentralized supply chain replaces the prod-
uct less frequently than what is optimal for the
supply chain as a whole. Consequently, we can ex-
pect that the remanufacturability choice in the
integrated supply chain would be superior to that
in the decentralized supply chain. However, less ob-
vious is our finding that the integrated supply chain
also chooses superior performance. It can be verified
that the replacement interval in the decentralized
supply chain drops faster with increased perfor-
mance than that in the integrated supply chain,
implying that the integrated chain is better able to
reduce costs through increased performance.
The manufacturer’s optimal price in the decen-
tralized case is rDSi ¼
f2
2aei
 bw, implying that the








f . That is, the customer’s rev-
enue from product use does not entirely translate






increase in the customer’s per-period revenue
f from product use results in a smaller increase
in total supply chain profit. While the integrated
supply chain’s profit increases linearly with f, the
supply chain profit in the decentralized case
increases only concavely with respect to f. Hence,
as regulators expand the use and stringency of EPR
instruments, firms have strong incentives to enter
into contracts that achieve supply chain coordination.
Proposition 4(ii) is relevant from a policy standpoint;
it demonstrates that coordination not only results
in higher supply chain profit but also drives envir-
onmentally superior product design choices.
Note, however, that supply chain coordination
does not necessarily imply greater social welfare.
By charging e and w, the regulator makes the manu-
facturer and the customer internalize the environ-
mental externalities of the product. In principle, a
social welfare-maximizing regulator would set e and
w so as to equate the marginal environmental charge
to the marginal environmental damage caused by
the product. Since we treat the regulator’s decisions
as exogenous to our model, we do not analyze
social welfare per se, although it would be a
worthwhile exercise for future research. We explore
the impact of EPR levers on design choices and firm
profits below.
4.2.3. Impact of EPR Parameters. We look at
comparative statics with respect to four parameters
that are exogenous to our model: cost during product
use (e), disposal cost at end-of-life (w), and the
customer’s share of these two costs (i.e., a and b,
respectively). Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B
summarize the comparative statics results for design
choices and profits, respectively. Proofs of these
results are omitted for brevity and are available
from the authors. We discuss the main effects below.
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40. Lower costs during use (e) induce
the manufacturer to provide higher performance
(q), but lower remanufacturability (y): The man-
ufacturer reaps a greater benefit for the same
increment in q when e is lower, since she shares
a fraction of e and also since she can raise
the price for a customer facing lower costs.
However, since the manufacturer’s optimal
price increases as e decreases, the customer
replaces the product less often, and the man-







@w o0. Higher waste disposal
costs (w) lead the manufacturer to provide higher q.
Moreover, higher w either has no effect on y (in the
uncoordinated supply chain) or leads to lower y
(in the coordinated supply chain): In the un-
coordinated supply chain, as w increases, the
manufacturer has to reduce the price charged
to the customer to maintain customer participa-
tion and therefore makes a lower profit. In-
terestingly, the manufacturer compensates for
this effect by investing in q and not y. This is
because the manufacturer always subsidizes
the customer’s share of w and effectively bears
the entire waste disposal cost herself. Lower e,
on the other hand, allows the manufacturer to
increase her price to the customer. Thus, the
manufacturer has an incentive to invest in q to
reduce e rather than to invest in y to reduce w.
On the other hand, the optimal replacement






. With increase in w, this interval
increases, i.e., the customer replaces the
product less often. Thus, the manufacturer’s




@a 40 if cqo eiq
 . As the customer bears
an increasing fraction of costs during use (i.e., as a
increases), the manufacturer provides higher y; the
manufacturer also provides higher q if cqo eiq
 : The
customer replaces the product more often if he
bears a higher fraction of costs during use, thus
providing the manufacturer with an incentive
to increase remanufacturability. Since the
manufacturer benefits if the customer incurs
lower e, the manufacturer increases q if doing
so reduces e at a faster rate than the rate at




@b ¼ 0. The split of waste disposal costs
between the manufacturer and the customer has
no effect on product design: As mentioned earlier,
the manufacturer subsidizes the customer’s
share of w and effectively bears the entire
waste disposal cost.
(b) Profit:
(i) The manufacturer’s and supply chain’s profits




@a _0 for awa0. In the decentralized
supply chain under symmetric information, the
manufacturer’s profit increases in a for small a and
decreases for larger a: For small a, the manu-
facturer’s profit increases as the customer bears
an increasing share of costs during product use,
but when a is large the manufacturer cannot






@b ¼ 0. Profits in the decentralized
supply chain under both symmetric and asymmetric
information are invariant with respect to b: This
again is because the manufacturer effectively
bears all of the disposal costs at end-of-life.
5. Coordinating Contracts: Analysis and
Implementation Under EPR
It is clear from our analysis thus far that coordination
improves supply chain profitability and the product’s
environmental features. As has been argued in the
supply chain literature, coordination can be achieved
among entities in a supply chain through properly
structured contracts (see Cachon 2003 for a review).
In our setting, the key to achieving supply chain
coordination is product replacements at the supply
chain-optimal frequency. Because a price-only con-
tract distorts the retailer’s replacement decision, a
coordinating contract needs at least two parameters.
There are different ways in which a coordinating
contract can be structured. First, the manufacturer can
specify the replacement interval t in addition to the
price r to be paid by the customer at each replacement
instance. Second, the manufacturer can offer the
customer a two-part tariff (r, F) that requires the
customer to pay a fixed fee F over the planning
horizon in addition to the price r paid at each
replacement instance. Third, as in leasing, the
manufacturer can use a non-linear contract menu
f(f(t), t)g, where the price for product replacements
depends on the replacement frequency chosen by the
customer. We derive each of these contracts and
discuss them in the EPR context.
5.1. Price-Replacement Interval (r, s) Contract
In this contract, the manufacturer takes charge of the
replacement decision by specifying the replacement
interval t in addition to the price r for product
replacements. Installed base management is an
Subramanian, Gupta and Talbot: Product Design and Coordination under EPR
266 Production and Operations Management 18(3), pp. 259–277, r 2009 Production and Operations Management Society
expanded version of such a contract, in which the
manufacturer assumes responsibility for the replace-
ment decision and also bundles maintenance services
along with the sale or lease of its product. Several
manufacturers such as Otis Elevators and Pitney
Bowes manage equipment at user sites, collect used
equipment from these sites, and install replacements
(Lehtonen 2005). Our analysis complements that
in Bhattacharya et al. (2005) in that we focus on
evaluating a similar contractual arrangement in the
context of EPR and assessing the impact on upstream
product design.
The sequence of decisions is as follows. The
manufacturer first chooses q and y jointly. She then
chooses the price r  c for product replacements and
the replacement interval t. The customer accepts the
pair (r, t) if he makes at least his reservation profit.
The profit for customer type i is f ðrþbwÞt 
aeit
2 . The
customer’s participation constraint is PCPRi  0, and
















Given q and y, the manufacturer’s profit increases
in the price charged to the customer. Hence, it is
optimal for the manufacturer to price the product at
rPRi ¼ ft bw
aeit2
2 . Substituting r

PRi
for r in (5), we










¼ tINi uniquely maximizes the












kT, which is identical to the integrated
supply chain’s profit in (2). Thus, the manufacturer
chooses the same q and y as in the integrated supply
chain benchmark, and the supply chain is fully
coordinated. Comparing r and t under the price-
replacement interval contract and under the price-

























In other words, under the price-replacement interval
contract, the manufacturer provides a price discount to
induce the customer to accept more frequent replace-
ments, similar to an ‘‘all units quantity discount’’
















i.e., the manufacturer’s average revenue per period is
higher under the price-replacement interval contract
than in the decentralized supply chain with a price-
only contract.
Installed base management contracts can thus in-
crease supply chain profit and provide greater
incentives to the manufacturer to invest in environ-
mentally favorable product design. One disadvantage
of such contracts, though, is that the customer does
not get to choose the replacement interval. This might
pose a hurdle for implementation at least in some
situations. The next two contracts that we discuss
achieve coordination while allowing the customer to
choose the replacement interval. We provide a com-
parative discussion of these contracts in Section 5.4.
5.2. Two-Part Tariff
In this contract, the manufacturer chooses a pair (r, F),
where r is the price charged to the customer for prod-
uct replacements and F is a fixed fee for the duration
of the planning horizon. Such contracts are commonly
suggested to coordinate channels (Dolan 1987, Jeu-
land and Shugan 1983). The sequence of decisions is
as follows. The manufacturer first chooses the design
features (q, y) and then decides the two-part tariff (r, F)
that maximizes her profit. The customer accepts (r, F)
if he makes at least his reservation profit after choos-
ing the optimal replacement interval. The customer’s




2  FT. The man-





















It can be verified that the manufacturer’s profit
is maximized (although not uniquely) at price






T. At this combination of price and fixed
fee, the customer’s incentives are aligned with those
of the supply chain and the customer chooses the








. As a result, the manufacturer’s profit is
identical to that of the integrated supply chain and
she chooses the supply chain-optimal q and y. We note
that the price-replacement interval contract in Section
5.1 is a special case of the two-part tariff contract with
the fixed fee restricted to zero. In the price-replacement
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interval contract, the manufacturer offers a specific
replacement interval to the customer whereas in the
two-part tariff contract, the manufacturer allows the
customer to choose the replacement interval. How-
ever, with symmetric information, the manufacturer
can fully anticipate and factor the customer’s choice
of the replacement interval in deciding the value of
r in the two-part tariff.
The intuition behind this contract is as follows. The
manufacturer prices the product at her effective mar-
ginal cost, thus making the customer the ‘‘residual
claimant.’’ The customer then faces the appropriate
incentives and chooses the supply chain-optimal
replacement frequency. The manufacturer’s effective
marginal cost is cþ ð1 bÞwþ ð1 aÞet22 (where t is
the replacement interval), which equals ð2 aÞðcþ
wÞ  bw at the supply chain-optimal replacement in-
terval. Without the fixed fee, the customer’s expected





. The manufacturer extracts
the total profit of the customer over the planning ho-
rizon via the fixed fee. Note, however, that multiple
combinations of price and the fixed fee can achieve
coordination.
5.3. Leasing
Starting with Coase (1972), many researchers have
examined the implications of selling versus leasing a
durable product for the manufacturer’s pricing and
distribution strategies (see Bulow 1982, Desai and
Purohit 1999). However, research to date has not
examined the implications of leasing when manufac-
turers are legally responsible for life-cycle environ-
mental costs and may therefore have an incentive to
invest in environmentally favorable product design.
The sequence of decisions is as follows. The man-
ufacturer first chooses q and y jointly. She then
chooses a menu f(fi(t), t)g that specifies combinations
of per-period product usage fees and corresponding
replacement intervals. The customer chooses a com-
bination from the menu such that his profit is
maximized. Note that because the customer does not
own the product, he returns the product to the man-
ufacturer at end-of-lease and is not liable for product
disposal costs (White et al. 1999). The customer still
incurs his share of costs during product use. The


















Under symmetric information, the manufacturer
can design a contract such that the customer’s partic-
ipation constraint is binding. Thus, the manufacturer
charges a per-period leasing fee fiðtÞ ¼ f aeit2 , which
exactly equals the customer’s average profit per pe-
riod and which decreases in the replacement interval
t. In particular, the customer would accept the con-















. Thus, the price-replacement
interval contract in Section 5.1 is a special case of
the leasing contract. For any (fi(t), t) chosen by
the customer, the manufacturer’s profit is PMLSi ¼
f ðcþwÞt 
eit
2  kT, which equals the integrated supply






turer chooses the supply chain-optimal q and y when





Given symmetric information, all three contracts—
price-replacement interval, two-part tariff, and leas-
ing—coordinate the supply chain as expected.
However, there are important differences in the ways
by which these contracts achieve coordination, the
manner in which they might be implemented, and
their relevance to EPR.
5.4.1. Coordination Mechanism and Customer
Participation. The price-replacement interval contract
works by having the manufacturer take charge of
product replacements, even though the customer
legally owns the product and is liable for costs
during product use and at end-of-life. On the other
hand, the customer never owns the product in a
leasing contract and thus cannot be held accountable
for end-of-life disposal costs, although the customer is
free to choose the replacement interval (note that we
assume an operating lease, as opposed to a capital
lease in which ownership transfers to the lessee at
the end of the lease term). The choice between these
two contracts in practice would depend on customer
preferences and certain product characteristics. Cus-
tomers might prefer the price-replacement interval
contract for complex products that tend to have
relatively long product life cycles and for which
close substitutes are not so easily available. Examples
include large-scale network servers and commercial
photocopiers. However, leasing may be attractive for
products such as small-scale computer equipment
and automobiles for which close substitutes are more
easily available and for which product disposal is
costly relative to the price of the product. Note that
most current EPR legislation focuses on the latter
type of products. The EU’s WEEE directive targets
electronic and electrical equipment, and the ELV
directive requires automobile manufacturers to take
back vehicles. Customers’ attitudes toward risk could
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play a role in the implementability of two-part tariff
contracts. If the fixed fee in a two-part tariff is charged
upfront, a high level of uncertainty in future envi-
ronmental legislation would deter customer partic-
ipation.
5.4.2. Implementation and Manufacturer’s Per-
spective. All of the contracts discussed above
require that the manufacturer know all customer
parameters, including customer type, the revenue
earned per period, and environmental costs incurred.
Even a simple price-only contract requires the
manufacturer to have this information for her to
maximize profit (Section 6 treats the scenario of
asymmetric information). However, the contracts
differ in terms of transaction costs involved in
design and implementation. A price-only contract is
obviously the simplest and has the least transaction
costs, followed by two-part tariff. In practice, a leasing
contract might also impose some conditions that
constrain product use in order to prevent abnormal
wear and tear; penalties could be imposed on the
customer depending on the condition of the end-of-
lease product. Moreover, since the manufacturer
maintains ownership of the leased product through-
out its life cycle, she is the one who faces the uncertainty
in environmental legislation. Price-replacement interval
contracts tend to be costly due to the administrative
burden on the manufacturer, especially when dealing
with a customer base that is widely dispersed. Even
so, several manufacturers have expanded their
reliance on installed base management contracts in
the recent past because such contracts lock in
customers, thereby increasing revenues and creating
entry barriers (Lehtonen 2005). Also, such contracts
imply a transition from selling the product to
providing product-service bundles, thus replacing a
possibly lumpy revenue stream with a more level
one. Also, from an environmental standpoint, such
‘‘servicizing’’ effectively reduces the amount of dura-
ble product waste that ends up in landfills (Reiskin
et al. 2000).
6. Asymmetric Information
We now analyze the scenario of asymmetric infor-
mation about customer attributes. We capture the
manufacturer’s uncertainty about the customer’s
costs through a prior probability distribution on cus-
tomer type. For exposition, we restrict ourselves to
two possible types for the customer: type 1 or normal
and type 2 or efficient. The manufacturer’s prior beliefs
are that the customer is normal with probability r
and efficient with probability 1 r, where rA[0, 1].
Consistent with our analysis in the earlier sections, we
assume that a normal customer incurs higher costs
during product use than an efficient customer, i.e.,
e14e2.
In Section 6.1, we illustrate how the manufacturer
can design a contract menu to improve supply chain
profit under asymmetric information. While we de-
rive a menu of contracts with parameters similar to
that in Section 5.1, the other contracts studied in Sec-
tion 5 can similarly be analyzed under asymmetric
information about customer attributes.
6.1. A Menu of Contracts
The manufacturer can offer a contract menu designed
in such a way that each customer type would choose
exactly the contract intended for it (Laffont and Tirole
1993). Invoking the revelation principle, we can re-
strict our attention to direct revelation mechanisms.
Given her prior beliefs r and 1 r on the customer
being type 1 (normal) and type 2 (efficient), respec-
tively, the manufacturer’s problem is to choose a




compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) con-
straints for the customer. IR constraints ensure that
the customer cannot be worse off by accepting the
manufacturer’s contract. IC constraints ensure that it
is in the interest of the customer to choose the contract
intended for his type.
The sequence of events is as follows. The manufac-
turer first chooses design attributes (q, y) for the prod-
uct. She then offers the contract menu ðrAM1 ; tAM1Þ;


ðrAM2 ; tAM2Þg to the customer. The customer accepts
the menu if he can make at least his reservation profit;
he chooses the contract that maximizes his profit.
Thereafter, the customer replaces the product at the
contracted replacement frequency and pays the con-
tracted price at each replacement instance. Thus,
the contract analyzed here can be viewed as a price-
replacement interval contract under asymmetric in-
formation. The manufacturer’s optimization problem
is
max
ðq;yÞ; ðrAM1 ;tAM1 Þ;ðrAM2 ;tAM2 Þf g
EPMAM




















Subject to : ICi :P
C
AMi
ðrAMi ; tAMiÞ  PCAMiðrAMj ; tAMjÞ;
i ¼ 1; 2; j 6¼ i; and
IRi :PCAMiðrAMi ; tAMiÞ  0; i ¼ 1; 2




customer type i’s profit from choosing ðrAM; tAMÞ
from the contract menu. IC constraints ensure that a
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type 1 customer is better off choosing ðrAM1 ; tAM1Þ and,
similarly, that a type 2 customer is better off choosing
ðrAM2 ; tAM2Þ. We first analyze the subgame where
the manufacturer decides the contract, given design
choices (q, y). Proposition 5 characterizes the optimal
contract.
PROPOSITION 5. Given her priors r and 1 r on customer
types 1 and 2, respectively, it is optimal for the manu-
facturer to offer the menu ðrAM1 ; t

AM1












































PROOF. See Appendix A.
We assume that the customer would weakly prefer
the contract intended for his type when indifferent
between the two contracts offered. Note that the con-
tract menu is structured in such a way that a type 1
customer is held to his reservation profit by choos-
ing ðrAM1 ; t

AM1
Þ, whereas a type 2 customer makes




manufacturer’s profit increases in price, she would
want to increase rAM2 in order to extract more rent
from a type 2 customer while ensuring that both
customer types reveal themselves truthfully through
their choices. She decreases the replacement interval
tAM1 below the supply chain-optimal replacement




¼ tIN1 (see Proposition 6).
At the same time, she sets price rAM1 such that she
extracts all of the type 1 customer’s profit. While the
revenue the manufacturer receives from a type 1
customer is effectively lower than under symmetric
information, the optimal menu allows the manufac-
turer to receive a higher revenue from a type 2
customer masquerading as type 1; i.e., the manufac-




Þ than at ðrPR1 ; t

PR1
Þ. To induce a type 2
customer to choose ðrAM2 ; t

AM2
Þ, she has to leave at
least as much rent as the type 2 customer would get
from choosing ðrAM1 ; t

AM1
Þ. She sets the replacement
interval intended for a type 2 customer equal to
the supply chain-coordinating replacement interval




but drops the price just enough so that the type 2




and ðrAM2 ; t

AM2
Þ. A type 1 customer obviously has




contract thus constitutes a separating equilibrium of
the subgame. Proposition 6 compares the optimal



























PROOF. See Appendix A.
Proposition 7 compares profits under the symmetric
and asymmetric information scenarios. For exposi-













tAMiÞ. Then, the manufacturer’s optimal expected
profit from offering the menu as in Proposition 5 is
EPMAM ¼ rPMAM1 þ ð1 rÞP
M
AM2
, since customer type i
chooses ðrAMi ; t

AMi
Þ in the separating equilibrium.
Similarly, expected customer profit can be written as
EPCAM ¼ rPCAM1 þ ð1 rÞP
C
AM2











¼ tIN1 and EP
M
AM ¼ PMAM1 ¼ P

IN1
, and when r5 0,




PROPOSITION 7. PMAM1  P

IN1
¼ PPR1  EP
M
AM  PMAM2




PROOF. See Appendix A.
Comparing the menu of contracts under asymmet-
ric information and the coordinating contracts under
symmetric information, we note the following:
(i) The manufacturer earns a lower profit from
either customer type under asymmetric infor-
mation than she would under symmetric
information.
(ii) The manufacturer earns a higher profit from
customer type 2 (efficient) than from customer
type 1 (normal) both under symmetric and
asymmetric information.
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(iii) The manufacturer’s expected profit from offer-
ing a menu of contracts under asymmetric
information is bounded below by her profit
from selling to a type 1 customer under sym-
metric information and above from selling to a
type 2 customer under symmetric information.
Thus, the manufacturer would prefer a price-
replacement interval contract with an efficient
customer than with a customer of unknown
behavior.
The above findings are consistent with those in the
literature on supply chain contracting under asym-
metric information (e.g., see Corbett et al. 2004, Özer
and Wei 2006), although the impact of asymmetric
information about customer attributes on product
design decisions in the context of EPR has not been
examined before. The manufacturer leaves some in-
formation rent on the table when she faces uncertainty
about the customer’s costs during product use. We
summarize the implication for total supply chain
profit in Corollary 2.
COROLLARY 2. The total expected supply chain profit un-
der the mechanism described in Proposition 5 is bounded
below by the profit of the integrated supply chain with a
type 1 customer, and above by the profit of the integrated
supply chain with a type 2 customer; i.e., PIN1  EP
M
AMþ
EPCAM  PIN2 .
PROOF. See Appendix A.
Manufacturer’s Design Choices: Having characterized
the manufacturer’s optimal contract design, we now
analyze the manufacturer’s product design decision.
Maintaining Assumption A6, we have that the man-
ufacturer’s expected profit EPMAM is jointly concave in
q and y. Denote qAM and y

AM as the manufacturer’s
profit-maximizing choices under asymmetric infor-
mation and the optimal contract menu. Proposition 8
characterizes the optimal design choices.
PROPOSITION 8.
(i) qIN1  q

AM  qIN2 .






PROOF. See Appendix A.
Under asymmetric information and the optimal
menu of contracts, the manufacturer’s design choices
lie between the coordinated supply chain’s choices
with customer types 1 and 2. In particular, an envi-
ronmentally positive uncertainty regarding customer
type (i.e., the manufacturer believes the customer
might be efficient) leads the manufacturer to provide
better environmental performance in the product with
an attendant loss in product remanufacturability. On
the other hand, an environmentally negative uncertainty
(i.e., the manufacturer believes the customer might
be inefficient) leads to opposite effects on the manu-
facturer’s choices of performance and remanufactur-
ability.
6.2. Discussion
As is clear from the analysis above, lack of perfect
information about customer behavior complicates the
manufacturer’s decisions. To induce revelation from
the customer, the manufacturer has to give up some
rent and cannot always implement the supply chain-
optimal replacement frequency. This, in turn, affects
her incentives to invest in environmentally beneficial
product design. Consequently, the impacts of EPR
levers on environmental and profit outcomes are
different under asymmetric information than the im-
pacts discussed in Section 4.2.3 for the case of
symmetric information. Comparative statics results
are summarized in Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B.
We discuss the main effects that are different under
asymmetric information.
(i) If the environmental cost during use for a type 1
customer (e1) is large relative to that for a type 2
customer (e2), an increase in e1 can lead the
manufacturer to invest in higher performance q,
contrary to the outcome under symmetric in-
formation where an increase in e always leads
the manufacturer to reduce q (see Table B1).
This behavior can be understood as follows:
as e1 increases, with e2 fixed, the extent of
information asymmetry is larger, and the man-
ufacturer makes smaller profits because she




IC and IR constraints. While the optimal con-
tract menu adjusts the replacement interval to
keep a type 1 customer at his reservation profit,
a type 2 customer benefits; his profits increase in
the difference (e1 e2). To partially compensate
for her loss in profits, the manufacturer in-
creases her investment in q because higher q
lowers both e1 and e2, thus allowing the man-
ufacturer to increase her prices and, therefore,
her profit. If e1 is close to e2, the impact of in-
formation asymmetry is small and q decreases
in e1 and e2—as is the case with symmetric in-
formation.
(ii) Under asymmetric information, larger w leads
to higher profit for a type 2 customer, and
induces the manufacturer to provide lower
remanufacturability (y). With increasing w faced
by both customer types, the manufacturer is
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forced to charge a lower price in order that
the IR and IC constraints remain satisfied.
Therefore, a type 2 customer’s profit increases
in w, similar to the effect discussed in (i) above.
Moreover, the replacement interval increases
with w, leading to a diminished incentive for the
manufacturer to provide y—as is the case with a
coordinated supply chain under symmetric in-
formation.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we analyzed design incentives faced
by a manufacturer producing and selling a reman-
ufacturable product to a customer when EPR policies
require both actors to bear environmental charges
over the product’s life cycle. Our analysis provides a
rich picture of the impacts of various EPR levers by
accounting for the fact that profit-maximizing manu-
facturers and customers in supply chains will react
optimally in response to changes in environmental
charges. Below, we summarize how we address the
three research questions presented in Section 1.
(i) Disposal costs are traditionally used to in-
fluence a product’s end-of-life environmental
impact. However, our results imply that dis-
posal charges could be used to encourage
designs that reduce the product’s environmen-
tal impact during use. Moreover, higher
charges for environmental impact during prod-
uct use can lead to better remanufacturability
that reduces the end-of-life environmental
impact of the product. Additionally, as the cus-
tomer bears a larger share of charges during
product use, the manufacturer has a greater
incentive to design the product to be more
remanufacturable.
(ii) We examined the impacts of a lack of supply
chain coordination on environmental product
design choices under symmetric and asymmet-
ric information. For the case of symmetric
information, we showed that coordination
leads not only to higher supply chain profit
as expected, but also to environmentally more
favorable product design. We analyzed con-
tracts that can help achieve coordination in a
decentralized supply chain—including price-
replacement interval, two-part tariff, and
leasing—and contrasted them in the context
of EPR.
(iii) A supply chain with an efficient customer in-
curs lower costs during use and therefore
replaces the product less often. However, this
lowers the manufacturer’s incentive to design
the product with greater remanufacturability,
since remanufacturing and disposal costs are
incurred less often. Thus, an efficient customer
does not unequivocally lead to superior prod-
uct design. The contracts that we studied under
symmetric information recognize these trade-
offs and help align supply chain incentives. If
the manufacturer lacks perfect information
about customer attributes that affect charges
incurred during product use, the manufacturer
can offer a menu of contracts consisting of price
and replacement interval pairs such that a cus-
tomer would choose the contract intended for
his type. The resulting design choices by the
manufacturer are impacted by her uncertainty
regarding the customer’s type. An environ-
mentally positive uncertainty regarding cus-
tomer type (i.e., the manufacturer believes the
customer might be efficient) leads the manu-
facturer to provide better environmental per-
formance in the product with an attendant loss
in product remanufacturability. On the other
hand, an environmentally negative uncertainty
(i.e., the manufacturer believes the customer
might be inefficient) leads to opposite effects on
the manufacturer’s choices of performance and
remanfacturability.
Several extensions to this work merit treatment in
future research. In assuming that remanufacturing is
profitable to the manufacturer and is also preferred by
the customer, we abstracted from the interactions be-
tween new and remanufactured products. We also
assumed that a single manufacturer sells to a single
customer. The effects of considering multiple custom-
ers and heterogeneous customer utilities are worth
evaluating. In addition, competition between manu-
facturers for customer demand can change upstream
outcomes in interesting ways. We studied the effects
of information asymmetry by focusing on costs in-
curred during product use. Asymmetric information
can be modeled and analyzed for other parameters as
well, such as the disposal cost incurred at end-of-life.
Uncertainty could be incorporated into the model in
other ways. There could be uncertainty in the success
of design efforts, in the likelihood that a returned
product can be remanufactured, and in environmental
policies or liabilities over time (Snir 2001). Also, an
important concern in remanufacturing is the uncer-
tainty in both the quality and the quantity of prod-
uct returns (Fleischmann et al. 2001, 2002). Finally,
additional insights into EPR policy design can be fa-
cilitated by endogenizing the policy parameters of the
model. Explicitly treating the regulator’s decision of
setting various EPR parameters will enable an assess-
ment of social welfare-maximizing policy choices that
go beyond our focus on environmental product de-
sign attributes and supply chain profit.
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Appendix A: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.
@PINi
@q
¼ g1ðq; yÞ  k1uq;
@2PINi
@q2
¼ g1qðq; yÞ  k1uqq:
@PINi
@y
¼ g2ðq; yÞ  k2vy;
@2PINi
@y2
¼ g2yðq; yÞ  k2vyy:
@2PINi
@q@y ¼ g3ðq; yÞ, where g1, g2, and g3 denote (for brev-
ity) the functions of q and y resulting from the said
differentiations.
The Hessian matrix of PINi with respect to q and y is
therefore
g1q  k1uqq g3
g3 g2y  k2vyy
 
:
The determinant of the above matrix is positive for
sufficiently large k1 and k2. Thus, for sufficiently large
k1 and k2, the Hessian matrix of PINi with respect to
q and y is negative definite, yielding the result. &


















































¼ ðcy þ wyÞffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2ðcþ wÞ
p ffiffiffiffie1p  ffiffiffiffie2pð Þ
o0; since cyo0; wyo0; and e14e2:
&
PROOF OF OBSERVATION 1.
PMDSi ¼





















PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.
(i) From (4), it is easy to verify that PMDSi increases
in i, since e14e2. &
(ii) @PMDSi
@q ¼ af eicq þ ðcþ wÞeiq
 	




afeiðcy þ wyÞ 
ky
T . With Assumption A6, it




















cqðe2  e1Þ þ ðcþ wÞðe2q  e1qÞ
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ðcy þ wyÞðe2  e1Þ½ 
o 0; since cyo0; wyo0; and e14e2:
&
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.







And from (4), we have
PMDSi ¼
























(ii) Since PMDSi and P

INi
are both jointly concave in
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. PCAM2ðrAM1 ; tAM1Þ4P
C
AM1
ðrAM1 ; tAM1Þ since e2oe1. Therefore, from IC2 we have




4PCAM1ðrAM1 ; tAM1Þ  0:
ðA2Þ
IR1 must bind. If not, looking at (A2), IR2 would
also not bind. Both rAM1 and rAM2 can then be in-
creased without violating the IC and IR conditions,
resulting in an increase in the manufacturer’s profit.
Also note that, at optimality, IC2 must bind. If IC2 does





4PCAM1ðrAM1 ; tAM1Þ ¼ 0;
ðA3Þ
in which case rAM2 can be increased without violating
the IC and IR conditions, resulting in an increase
in the manufacturer’s profit. Solving for PCAM1ðrAM1 ;




yields the result. &
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.








, and when r5 1, tIN1 ¼
















 tAM1 follows from above and




(ii) We know that PCDS1ðr

DS1







2  bw. Also, from Proposition 5,




























i.e., if f  ae1tDS1 , since t

DS1
4tAM1 from part (i)
above;




, which is implied by the
customer’s participation constraint.
Also, we know that PCDS2ðr

DS2







2  bw. From Proposition 5, we know


































i.e., if f  ae2tDS2 ; since t

DS2
4tAM2 from part (i)
above;




, which is implied by the
customer’s participation constraint.&
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7. We prove Proposition 7 in
steps.
(a) When rA(0, 1), although PCAM1ðr

AM1
; tAM1Þ ¼ 0,
we have tAM1 6¼ t

IN1
, implying that the replace-
ment interval for a type 1 customer is different
than the supply chain coordinating replacement
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(b) From the proof of Proposition 5, we know that
when rA(0, 1), PCAM2ðr

AM2




tAM1Þ40, implying that customer type 2 makes
a positive profit as a result of asymmetric infor-
mation. Hence, the manufacturer’s profit from
type 2 customer, i.e., PMAM2 , has to be less than
the profit of the coordinated supply chain with a















4PMAM1 . When r5 1, using the ex-
pressions for tAM1 and t

AM2
in Proposition 5, we
have
The numerator on the right hand side of (A5) is
40 if




2 tAM2ðe1  e2Þ
















Since aA[0, 1], (A6) is always true. Hence, when
r5 1, we still have PMAM1oP
M
AM2
. From (A4) and























occur at r5 1. But PMAM2 P
M
AM1





(d) At r5 1, PMAM1 ¼ P

IN1
. Therefore, from part (c)







































rðcþ wÞ½aðe1  e2Þð1 rÞ þ re1
p
. The roots of





2 ð1aÞ2e1það1aÞe2½  , which are imaginary.
Hence, EPMAM decreases convexly in r from P

IN2
at r5 0 to PIN1 at r5 1.
The result follows from parts (a) through (e). &















. Then, EPMAM þ EPCAM ¼ rPSCAM1 þ ð1 rÞ
PSCAM2 . Since t

AM2
¼ tIN2 , we have P
SC
AM2
¼ PIN2 . In

















PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8.








know from Proposition 7 that PIN1  EP
M
AM 
PIN2 , and that EP
M
AM decreases convexly in r
from PIN2 at r5 0 to P

IN1
at r5 1. It suffices to























að1 rÞtAM1ðe1  e2Þ
h









, e14e2, eiqo0, and e1q4e2q.





















4ðcþ wÞðtAM2  t

AM1
Þ  a ðtAM1Þ
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By expanding and collecting terms, we can verify
that the right-hand side of (A8) is 40, yielding the
result.





















@r is well behaved since f is well
behaved and @f@q
AM






@r40. For convenience, denote
qAM0 :¼ q

AMðr0Þ. We will show that it is impossible
























above, we must have
@PIN2
@q jq¼qAM0




¼ @@qe2tAM2o0. Therefore, the














40. Thus, we have a contradiction.




r5 0, EPMAM ¼ PMAM2 ¼ P

IN2
. We know from
Proposition 7 that PIN1  EP
M
AM  PIN2 , and
that EPMAM decreases convexly in r from P

IN2
at r5 0 to PIN1 at r5 1. We also know from
Proposition 2 that yIN14y

IN2
. It suffices to show
































































AM; cyo0; and wyo0:
&
Appendix B
Table B2 Comparative Statics: Profit with respect to Environmental Costs
and Parameters
Section/scenario
Sign of 1st and 2nd derivatives w.r.t.
e1 e2 w a b
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
3 ‘‘IN’’
Type 1 customer, SC profit  1 12 0 0  1 NA NA NA NA
Type 2 customer, SC profit 0 0  1  1 NA NA NA NA
4.1 ‘‘DS’’
Type 1 customer, SC profit 5
Manufacturer profit  0 0 0  0   0 0
Type 2 customer, SC profit 5
Manufacturer profit
(Customer profit 5 0)
0 0  0  0   0 0
6.1 ‘‘AM’’
SC profit      1   0 0
Manufacturer profit  1  1  1  1 0 0












Table B1 Comparative Statics: Design with respect to Environmental Costs
and Parameters
Section/scenario
Sign of 1st derivative of optimal q and y w.r.t.
e1 e2 W a b
q y q y q y q y q y
3 Integrated ‘‘IN’’
Type 1 customer  1 1 0 0 1  NA NA NA NA
Type 2 customer 0 0  1 1  NA NA NA NA
4.1 Decentralized ‘‘DS’’
Type 1 customer  1 0 0 1 0  2 1 0 0
Type 2 customer 0 0  1 1 0  1 0 0
6.1 Asymmetric information ‘‘AM’’






2e.g., qDS1 is unimodal in a.
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